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WHAT IS LICENSURE?

Kara Schmitt
Bureau of Occup & Prof Reg

When most individuals hear the terms license and licensure, their first reaction
is that these are easily understood and relatively simple words. Everyone knows
what these terms mean. Or do they?
What is licensure? It is a multi-faceted, complex governmental system of
regulation with the stated purpose being public protection. According to Webster's
dictionary (Guralnik, 1976), a license is defined as "a formal permjssion to do
something: esp., authorization by law to do some specified thing (license to marry,
practice medicine, hunt, etc.)." The term Licensure is then defined to mean "the
act or practice of granting licenses, as to practice a profession." Unfortunately, the
dictionary definitions encompass a myriad of activities for which the terms license
or licensure may be applicable and only serve to further complicate what is meant
by these related terms.
Licensure confers upon a licensee the legal authority to practice an occupation
or profession I. In 1952, The Council of State Governments defined licensing as:
the granting by some competent authority of a right or permission to carryon a
business or do an act which would otherwise be illegal. The essential elements
Recognition and appreciation is given to Lise Sm ith-Peters, CLEAR, for her assistance in
compi ling the 1993 regulatory data. T hanks also goes to Bruce Douglas and Eric We rner (CO Dept.
of Regu latory Agencies); Robert Nebiker (VA Dept. of Health Professions) ; and Rae Ramsdell (MI
Dept. of Commerce - BOPR) for their review and critique of the material.
1Licen sure is one of the forms of regulatory control states have over individual s wishing to
practice certain occupations or professions. The term "reg ul ation" will be used throughout thi s chapter
to include all form s of states' authority to control practice. Note that although licensure is the
respons ibility of individual states, there are a few profess ions that require federal licensure (e.g.,
airplane pi lots, certain railroaders, nucl ear power plant operators, and certain c lasses of merchant
seamen).
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of licensing involve the stipulation of circumstances under which permission to
perform an otherwise prohibited activity may be granted-largely a legis lative
function; and the actual granti ng of the permission in specific cases- generall y an
administrative responsibility. (p. 5)

Later, Shimberg and Roederer (1994) rephrased the above definition of
professional licensure.
Licensing is a process by which an agency of government grants permission to an
individual to engage in a given occupation upon finding that the applicant has
attai ned the minimal degree of competency required to ensure that the public
health, safety, and welfare wi ll be reasonably well protected. (p. I)

Occupational and professional licensure is an activity reserved to each state by
the federal constitution; the exercising of a state's inherent police power. Licensure
is designed to protect citizens from mental, physical, or economic harm that could
be caused by practitioners who may not be sufficiently competent to enter the
profession.
Whether licensure is viewed as a privilege or a right, it is to be granted only to
individuals who demonstrate to the satisfaction of a state that they possess, at the time
of initial licensure, the req uisite minimal level of knowledge, skills, and abilities
determined necessary to practice competently. Malcolm Parsons (1952) emphasized
that permission is the essential element of licensure and that such permission "may be
granted or denied, renewed or refused to be renewed, withdrawn temporarily through
suspension, or withdrawn altogether through revocation" (p. 4). A license is not
unconditionally granted to an individual, but usually for only a finite period of time
and can be removed or limited by a state for a number of reasons.
Paradoxically, although freedom is a cornerstone of the Constitution of the
United States, licensure imposes considerable restrictions upon an individual's
freedom to pursue certain career choices. Once a profession has been legislatively
mandated to be licensed, it is illegal for an individual to practice that profession or
use a specific title without first obtaining the necessary license. Additionally, in
order to obtain a license, an individual must have been successful at meeting a
variety of requirements.
Even with the expanded definitions of licensure, it is still a complex and often
misunderstood term. The Hindoo fable, as told by John Saxe (1949), entitled The
Blind Men and The Elephant provides an allegorical framework for appreciating the
complexity associated with licensing.
Once there were six blind men who went to "see" an elephant so that through
touch they might satisfy themselves as to what an elephant was. Each man touched
a different part of the elephant and accordingly determined that an elephant was like
six different items with which they were familiar. The first touched the side and
proclaimed the elephant to be like a wall. The second felt the tusk and decided it
was similar to a spear. The third took hold of the trunk and said that the elephant
was like a snake. The fourth reached out and touched the knee and declared the
elephant to be like a tree. The fifth found the ear and as the ear moved, the blind
man decided it was like a fan. Finally, the sixth man seized upon the swinging tail
and thought the elephant was like a rope. The fable ends with the following lines:
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And so these men of Indostan
Disputed loud and long,
Each in his own opinion
Exceeding stiff and strong,
Though each was partly in the right
And all were in the wrong! (p. 123)
The moral of this fable is that confrontations and wars are often started because
the parties "rail on in utter ignorance of what each other mean, And prate about an
Elephant not one of them has seen!" (Saxe, 1949, p. 123). Until the various factions
are familiar with and understand the opposing views of all parties, battles and
confusion will continue with little hope of resolution.
Although many individuals have encountered the "beast" called licensure, their
perception of it is blinded by their personal involvement with it. In many instances,
the various perceptions and encounters with licensure create a situation in which
"each [is] partly in the right and all [are] in the wrong." Furthermore, although
debates about licensure may not lead to a full scale war, there are certainly a number
of battles being fought over licensure in terms of what it entails, the scope of
regulated activity, who should be licensed, and how it should be organized.
For members of a profession seeking initial licensure legislation, it may be
viewed as a political game that must be won. For the candidate who hopes to
practice a licensed profession, it may be viewed as an overwhelming hurdle that
must be jumped. For the regulator, it is like walking a tightrope trying to balance
the interests of the profession along those of the state/public. For the investigator,
it is similar to a game of poker in which both skill and luck are necessary in order
to obtain sufficient proof of wrongdoing. Board members who are also licensees
may view it as a tug of war in which they are pulled between the mandates of their
appointed public position and the desires of their professional association.
Regardless of the various perceptions, if members of each of these groups were
asked to define licensure, the responses would undoubtedly be fairly similar and
incorporate the following phrase- protection of the public. Even if everyone were
to use the same phrase, the individual perceptions of licensure create continuous
conflicts as to what is really meant by the term. In essence, licensure involves
politics, economic considerations for the public and profession, cost analyses in
terms of the benefits derived versus the costs involved, conflict resolution, police
power, discipline, competency assurance, mediation, and above all, an attempt to
protect the public.
There is a built- in premise that a license is necessary to promote proficiency
and maintain standards in a profession. In and of itself, licensure cannot guarantee
the public's protection nor the competency of the licensee. It merely indicates that
an individual has met the initial requirements of education, experience, minimal
competence as measured by an examination, or a combination of the three.
Continued competence, not just continuing education, is rarely required to be
demonstrated and a licensee's ethics and morals are generally evaluated only when
the potential for disciplinary action is being considered. Granted, a number of
professions require an individual to possess "good moral character" at the time of
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licensure, yet the meaning of this term is often nebulous. With the exception of a
criminal conviction, good moral character is rarely used as grounds for the denial
of a license.
The public relies upon the credentials of an individual to evaluate whether a
practitioner is competent. And yet, is this an accurate method by which to judge
someone who will have a direct physical, emotional, or financial impact on one's
life? Carl Rogers (1973), past president of the American Psychological Association, would claim that reliance upon a license to judge a professional should be used
only if additional information about that person's competence is available. Although Dr. Roger's comments reference certification, the same sentiment could
apply to licensure.
If you had a good friend badly in need of therapeutic help and I gave you the name
of a therapist who was a Diplomate in Clinical Psychology, with no other
information, would you send your friend to him? Of course not. You would want
to know what he is like as a person and as a therapist, recognizing that there are
many with diplomas on their walls who are not fit to do therapy, lead a group, or
help a marriage. So, certification is not equivalent to competence. (Rogers, 1973,
p. 382)

As Dr. Rogers points out, there is more involved in ensuring public protection
than simply hanging a license on a wall.
Historical Perspective

How did licensure evolve? The first attempt to regulate any professions may
have been the tariff imposed on medical practitioners in the year 2000 B.C. (Gross,
1984; Hogan, 1979; and Young , 1987). The Babylonian Code of Hammurabi
stipu lated both surgeon's fees and penalties for what is now considered malpractice.
According to historical writings, one such penalty was the severing of a surgeon's
hand when an operation resulted in a patient's death. The restrictions on women
practicing certain professions dates back to 300 B.C. when the laws of Greece
specifically barred women from medical practice.
In the 13th century, the king of Sicily established the foundation for current
licensing laws by implementing standards to control the medical profession. Prior
to becoming recognized as a medical doctor, an individual had to have completed
3 years of philosophy, 5 years of medicine, and 1 year of practical experience, and
must have passed an examination prepared by a medical facility. Practicing without
a license was prohibited. The law also establi shed fee schedules, mandated that free
service be available to indigents, established ethical codes with strong penalties,
and made it unlawful for a physician to own an apothecary.
During the later 13th through middle 15th centuries, various professional
Guilds were establi shed throughout Europe. Although the initial Guilds had fairly
lax requirements, eventually they became quite restrictive in their membership by
means of imposing stringent requirements, sim ilar to today's licensure requirements. Guilds required compulsory membership; high entrance fees with approval
of other members before a new member could be admitted; a period of apprenticeship (up to 7 years in some instances); a limitation on the number of apprentices that
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a member might have; and the establishment of minimum prices for services and
a maximum wage for workers. The Guilds started to disappear during the 15th
century because a more laissez-faire system became dominant plus there was an
increase in the economic market and general accumulation of wealth.
The first actual licensing law, comparable to those of today, involved medical
doctors and was enacted in England in 1511. Three classes within the medical field
were licensed- physicians, surgeons, and apothecaries. Battle lines were drawn
with the physicians feeling they were the superior group and attempting to reduce
the size of the other two professions. The Apothecaries Act of 1815 gave the
Society of Apothecaries the right to examine and establish standards for those
wishing to become apothecaries. It also established penalties for individuals who
practiced medicine illegally. Unfortunately, the enforcement powers of this act
were not very extensive and regulatory efforts were quite weak.
Finally, the Medical Act of 1858 merged the three professions and led to the
enforcement of uniform standards in the examinations. It also provided for the
creation of a list of licensees and only those on the list could sue for medical fees
or hold public office. The law did not, however, forbid the practice of medicine by
lay persons.
The earliest licensing laws (medical profession) in the United States were
enacted by Virginia in 1639, Massachusetts in 1649, and New York in 1665. The
Virginia law was created as a result of numerous complaints about the fees charged
by the medical profession. The Massachusetts law was intended to regulate
activities of:
"Chirurgeons, Midwives, Physitians or others [who were] imployed at any time
about the bodye of men, women or chi ldren, for preservation of life, or health." No
such persons were to practice "without the advice and consent of such as are skillfu l
in the same Art (if such may be had) or at least some of the wisest and gravest then
present". If these rules were not obeyed, violators were subject to "such severe
punishment as the nature of the fact may deserve." (Shryock, 1967, p. I )

Although the above language may give the appearance that the regulation was
intended to protect the public from harm , the prevailing reason for medical
licensing may have actually been unrelated to a concern for competency. During
the early days of regulation, the colonial laws and court actions were generally more
concerned with fees than with the quality of service provided.
Virtually no further legislation regulating the medical profession, or any other
profession, occurred until the mid- 1700s at which time a number of other states
instituted legislation to regulate medical doctors as well as lawyers. During the next
100 years (until the mid- 1800s), many states enacted regulatory legislation and
then eliminated the legislation due to conflicts between whether graduation from a
"chartered" school was sufficient for licensure or whether additional requirements
were necessary.
By 1850, the practice of medicine in the United States was avai lable to almost
anyone who desired to perform the tasks associated with medicine. Only New
Jersey and the District of Columbia had a law in 1850 that even resembled
regulation of the medical profession. One reason for deregulation was that the

8

SCHMITT

education of medical practitioners was perceived to be so much greater than it had
been when the laws were first established. Also, the medi cal fac ilities were
effective in convincing the legislators that training standards were being met. The
same was true for the legal profession. In fac t, nearly two- thirds of the states had
abolished all regulation of lawyers by 1840 and many states were even contemplating the abolishment of the legal profession in its entirety.
The attitude of state legislators concerning the necessity for regulation changed
again in the late 1800s. State medical societies were becoming increasingly
distressed with the lack of standards and the poor quality of many emerging
proprietary schools. In an attempt to force change, the individual state societies
formed the American Medical Association, which was finally abl e to make an
impact on the need for regulation. Texas was the first state to pass a law
establi shing a state examining board. Follow ing the Texas action in 1873, states
began re- instituting medical licensing boards and enacting regulatory legislation.
By the end of the 19th century, 37 states regulated the medical profess ion. New
Hampshire was the last state (1 9 15) to license the profess ion (The Council of State
Governments, 1952, p. 80).

Present Status of Licensure
During the first half of the 20th century , licensing laws were primarily limited
to those professions having a direct relationship to public health and safety. The
basic premi se was that most consumers of services provided by health care
practitioners could not judge adequately the quality of the care provided. Following
the enactment of regulation for a few professions on the basis of thi s premi se, the
need for "public protection" quickly became a convenient, but effective, argument
fo r every group seeking regulation.
Milton Friedman (1 96 1) references a study indicating that "occupati onal
licensure is by now very widespread .... and by 1952, more than 80 separate
occupations ... had been licensed by state law" (p. 139). He mu st be aghast at how
widespread occupational licensure is now. In 1968, the medi an number of
professions licensed by states was 37, ranging from 25 in Washington to a high of
57 in Michigan (The Council of State Governments, 1968, p.l). A 1986 report by
the American Association of Retired Persons estimated that there were at least 800
professions licensed. According to a 1990 publication, states collectively regul ated
over 1,000 profess ions, yet fewer than 60 profess ions were regulated by all or most
states (Brinegar, 1990).
It is probably impossible to know exactly how many professions are actually
regul ated because of the various ways in which the data are collected and analyzed.
Regardless of whether the above figures are completely accurate, it is cl ear that an
"overwhelming" number of professions are regulated by states.
For approximately 60 profess ions (i.e., Medicine, Nursing, Engineering, and
Architects) comparable licensing requirements exist in all states, the District of
Columbia, and many of the U.S. territories. For most professions, however, the
regulation of occupations and professions varies among the states. Some of the
more unu sual professions regulated in at least one state include: Babcock testers,
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bankruptcy salespersons, wire rope inspectors, lime vendors, mussel fishers, pheasant club operators, safe mechanics, apprentice scalers, resident and non- resident
sea moss rakers, tree inj ectors, weather modifiers, livestock weighers, li ghtning rod
installers, hemp growers, endless chain agents, and egg brokers (Brinegar, 1990).
What individuals in these occupations actually do and why regulation is needed
may not always be comprehensible.
In the immediate past, the emphasis was on licensure, licensure, and more
licensure without the appearance of much regard for whether the laws were
necessary to protect the public from harm or quackery. Any profession that could
get the support of a senator or representative had an excellent chance of obtaining
licensure status. In fact, licensing legislation may have been based not so much on
logic, but rather on who introduced the bill, who the lobbyist was, and how much
financial backi ng was available.
In the 1950s an ill- conceived licensure bill was introduced into the Californ ia
legislature. The proposed legislation required licensure for anyone, including
children, who mowed lawns for money. The penalty for noncompliance would
have been a fine up to $500 and impri sonment for up to 6 months. Fortunately, this
bill failed to win support by the legislature as it definitely would not have been in
the public's best interest. Such legislative foresight has not always been apparent
as evidenced by the previous noninclusive li st of questionable regulation.
One reason for the increase in regulation during the 1970s and 1980s may have
been the growth of allied health professions. These professions alone did not,
however, account for the rapid rise in professional and occupational regulation
during the last 40 years.
During a series of four regional workshops conducted in 1975 2, the following
comments were made by some of the legislators who attended. Based on their
comments, these legislators were cognizant that requests for licensure are not
always based on public protection. Similar views may not have been held by other
legislators as the proliferation of licensing laws continued for the next 15 years.
We have been besieged, as have most legislative bodies, by requests from groups
for add itional licensure. All kinds of groups are coming to us req ues ting that they
be given the ri ght to license .. .. obviously the only way the legislation could proceed
[i s] if there was some public interest at stake.
Another big problem is this proliferation that we are running into. Everybody
wants to be licensed or certified. Don't kid yourself- they want it because it is a
status thing, and we're fighting them as hard as we can .
New licensing- those who would like to be lice nsed- shocks me. When I came
into this arena I could not believe that everyone in the country felt they needed a
license. The stack of licensing bills I have is so hi gh you wouldn ' t believe. I
' Ben Shimberg, a lead ing authority in regu lat ion , coord in ated these four regional workshops. The
purposes for these conferences were to (a) determine problems and iss ues related to regul ation; (b)
ascertain the interest of state offic ials to participate in cooperative projects aimed at resolving these
problems; and (c) develop strategies which would he lp bring about needed reg ulatory change. Nearly
100 individuals from 30 states attended these meetings. Various comments expressed by the participants
are included in this chapter.
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personally do not see the need for it. I don ' t think it means better service to the
people of our state.
Nobody has defined which things should be licensed arid which shouldn't. Where
do you draw the line? Which are valid public purposes and which are simply for
the aggrandizement of a particular group? (Shimberg, 1976, pp. 11 - 12)

The enactment of new licensing laws appears to have slowed during the last
few years even though the number of licensure bills continues to flourish. In some
states, the decline in the number of newly licensed professions may, unfortunately,
be based more on budgetary reasons than on the legislators' thorough understanding of when licensing laws should or should not be enacted.
The stated purpose for licensure is public protection and yet licensure laws
have rarely been enacted as a result of the public's outcry that they were being
harmed. It is not the public demanding the enactment of these laws, but rather the
professions themselves who spend thousands of dollars on lobbyists to ensure that
"their" bill is passed. According to Linda McCready, "a good lobbyist can do more
for the interest of a profession than years of national conventions can" (1982, p.
74).
Legislative decisions regarding licensure are generally made with little or no
input from the public. On the other hand, members of a profession seeking
licensure are always well represented. "Of course, they are more aware than others
of how much they exploit the customer and so perhaps they can lay claim to expert
knowledge" (Friedman, 1962, p. 140). The legislative process may, at best, only
coincidentally serve the interests of the public. According to Milton Friedman
(1962),
The declaration by a large number of different state legislatures that barbers must
be approved by a committee of other barbers is hardly persuasive evidence that
there is in fact a public interest in having such legislation. Surely the explanation
is different; it is that a produce group tends to be more concentrated politically than
a consumer group. (p. 143)

The principal argument offered by professions seeking licensure is that the
public is incapable of determining or judging whether a practitioner is competent.
This argument may be appropriate in some instances, but not in all cases. Shimberg
(1991) states that "virtually all licensing laws have been passed at the behest of the
occupational group to get certain benefits for their members, and, [only] incidentally, to help the public" (p. 1). In addition to the main argument offered in their
attempt to secure licensure status, there are a number of other reasons why
professions actually seek regulation. Members of professional associations believe
that licensure will:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Lead to enhanced economic benefits;
Provide practitioners with increased status;
Protect the reputation of the profession;
Provide a symbol of respectability;
Demonstrate that the profession is well established;
Define the professional field more clearly;
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7. Provide for the payment of services by thi rd- party payers; and
8. Control the number and geographic distribution of practitioners.
Although there is nothing inherently wrong with the first seven licensure
outcomes, they should not serve as the principal reasons for seeking or being granted
licensure status. Controlling the number and geographic distribution of practitioners,
however, should never be the purpose for or the intended result of licensure.
Critics claim that licensure serves only the interests of a specific group by
enhancing their status and limiting competition which improves their economic
position. Unreasonable restrictions on job entry and mobility impact negatively
upon the avail ability, quality , and cost of services .
In the past, anticompetitive regulations were viewed by legislators and the
public as being "essential to ensure high professional morality and performance"
(Blair & Rubin, 1980, p. vii). As exemplified by the following statement, this view
is no longer being accepted by the public: "A gullible public was taken in by the
propaganda about protecting consumers from cheats and incompetents. Now
consumers are beginning to see that they are being forced to pay a very high price
fo r protection of dubious value" (Shimberg, 1976, p. 46).

Sunrise
In an effort to better ensure that new regulation of additional occupations and
professions is fo r the benefit of the public rather than solely fo r the profession, a
number of states have implemented Sunri se legislation. Sunri se is a legislative
process applying specific criteri a to evaluate the appropri ateness of the requested
new regulatory legislation.
Typically, professional groups or associations draft legislation providing for
the regulation of the profession and then attempt to convince the legislature of its
necessity. Under the Sunri se process, the legislature, a legislatively enacted body ,
and/or a designated admini strative body review the applications for regulation to
determine whether licensure, or another form of reg ul ation, should be granted.
Restricting the number of new licensed profess ions is viewed by the proponents of
S unri se to be more effective than trying to elimi nate those already in existence.
The first Sunrise legislation was enacted by M innesota in 1973 and dealt
exclusively with the regul ation of allied health personnel. Since that time, 17 states
have implemented fo rmal Sunrise reviews of proposed regulation. States that have
formal Sunri se legislati on are indicated in Table 1. Many other states, particularl y
those with central agencies res ponsible fo r overseeing the administrative components of regulation, have instituted simil ar reviews of proposed legislation even
though there is no mandate to perform this task.
Shimberg and Roederer (1994) have suggested that all legislators, partic ularl y
those who do not have a formal Sunrise process, consider carefully the answers
obtained fro m asking the fo llowing questions of occupations or profess ions who
wish licensure status:
1. What is the problem?
2. Why should the occupational group be regulated?
3. What efforts have been made to address the problems?
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Table 1. Sunrise and Sunset Legislation By State!

STATE
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota

SUNRISE LEGISLA nON
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No

SUNSET LEGISLA nON
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No2
No2
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
No
(continued .... )
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Table 1 (continued)
STATE

SUNRISE LEGIS LA TION

SUNSET LEGIS LATION

Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
Washington, DC

Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
No

TOTALS

17

22

IInformation was obtained through an informal telephone survey conducted by CLEAR
in October, 1993.
2Sunset Legislation was repealed in 1993

4.
S.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Have alternatives to licensure been considered?
Will the public benefit from regulation of the occupation?
Will regulation be harmful to the public?
How will the regulatory activity be administered?
Who is sponsoring the regulatory program?
Why is regulation being sought? (pp. 2S- 33)

In addition to these questions, legislators should also make certain that each of
the following conditions exists before regulation is enacted.
1. Clear evidence demonstrates a significant danger to the public's health,
safety or welfare by the unregulated practice.
2. A scope of practice can be clearly defined and includes acts, tasks and
functions related to demonstrable skills and the acquisition of a
substantive body of knowledge.
3. Professional practice is done independently with little or no supervision by presently licensed individuals or agencies.
4. The cost of regulation will be reasonable and the resultant impact of
regulation on the cost and availability of services will be minimal
compared to the protection afforded the public.
S. Expanded availability and/or a lower cost of service will occur and are
in the public's best interest.
6. Assistance is required for the public to differentiate between qualified
and unqualified practitioners or the public is unable to differentiate
among professional titles where similar services are provided.
7. Unnecessary barriers to entry will not be created.
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8. The efficient use of auxiliary or paraprofessional personnel will not be
adversely affected.
9. Evidence exists that the public cannot be protected effectively through
other means.
If most of these conditions do not apply to a profession seeking licensure, the
proposed regulatory bill should be defeated or less restrictive regulation enacted.
Sunrise, or any type of preregulation legislative review, will lose its effectiveness
if a careful analysis of these, and other, issues is not performed.
Sunset

In an attempt to overcome unnecessary, outdated, or inefficient regulation, a
number of states have instituted Sunset legislation. Sunset is the formal legislative
review of regulation that currently exists as opposed to the review of proposed
legislation. William O. Douglas, Chairman of the Securities and Exchange
Commission under Franklin D. Roosevelt, is credited with the idea for a Sunsettype approach to legislative oversight. His proposal was that federal agencies
should be abolished after 10 years (Kearney, 1990).
Colorado was the first state to adopt a Sunset Law in 1976. Two comments
from participants at the 1975 workshops directly relate to the tasks performed by
Sunset Review:
... establish a review process so that "deregulation" or program modification would
take place when the need fo r regulation ceased to exist or when the program was
not fulfilling its public purpose in an acceptable manner. (Shimberg, 1976, p. 11)
The objectives of regulation (should] be stated as precisely as possible at the time
each regulatory law is enacted. The extent to which these goals were met would
constitute the major basis for deciding whether or not the regulatory law should be
continued. (Shimberg, 1976, p. 16)

Sunset was promoted as a way to eliminate unnecessary agencies, curtail the
proliferation of rules and regulations, and force greater accountability. The process
has been used to evaluate not only licensing boards and functions, but all agencies of
the executive branch within a state. Sunset requires legislators to evaluate the existing
laws, rules, and operations of agencies and determine whether they are in the public's
interest and should be continued, modified, or eliminated. Sunset legislation also
mandates that an agency and its regulatory activities cease to exist on a specified date
unless the legislature takes affirmative action to continue the existence of the agency
(regulation) by enactment or replacement with a new statute.
In general, Sunset reviews focus on the following questions:
Is the regulation needed to protect the public interest?
If it is needed, is the current regulation effective?
If it is not effective, can it be improved?
Is the current regulation unnecessarily restrictive and, if so, how could
it be revised? (Douglas, 1988)
Based on the answers to these questions, agencies and the regulation of certain
professions may be eliminated or revisions made to the corresponding laws and
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rules. Administrative procedures may also be revised based on a Sunset review. In
some instances, a professional board itself may be discontinued, but the regulation
is continued under a different administrative structure. In rare instances, professions might be combined so that future decisions are made by ajoint board composed
of members from the various professions. Regardless of the outcome, the Sunset
process provides an impetus for reform and requires legislators to focus on problems
and issues that face the public, a profession, and the agency overseeing the profession.
Sunset is intended to promote and provide for an open, apolitical structure in
which reform and improvements can be made to the regulatory operations. Unfortunately, this has not always occurred as evidenced by events that took place in two
states- Colorado in 1981 and Texas in 1993.
Starting in 1978, the State Board of Registration for Professional Engineers
and the Colorado Department of Regulatory Agencies, the central agency responsible for administration of this and other boards, became embittered in numerous
confrontations centering on personnel matters and policy issues. At one point, the
Board sued the Department Director and later drafted legislation that would have
eliminated the entire Department. As might be anticipated, there was a lot of
mutual suspicion and resentment as well as a lot of political maneuvering when the
Sunset Review for Engineers was initiated in 1981.
The Colorado Engineering Counci l ... worked extensively on sunset and appointed
a standing committee that drafted its own bill, obtained its own sponsors and
basically shut the Department out of the process. We were not invited to the
meetings, our requests to participate were refused and so on. The profession
clearly decided that they were going to do it their own [way] using their political
influence in the legislature and not deal with the Department, which sti ll had the
responsibility under Colorado law for fram ing recommendations to the legislature
and performing the actual review and report on the need for regulation.
It became apparent that a bill was going to be introduced, which the Department
had never even seen or had access to, and we felt that this would result in a
complete end run around the sunset process, setting a dangerous precedent for the
future of sunset. (Douglas, 1988, p. 7)

In an effort to counteract the secret bill being drafted on behalf of the engineers,
two employees of the Department drafted their own secret bill, recruited a senator
to sponsor the bill, and convinced the attorney doing the legislative drafting of the
engineers' bill to set it aside and provide a quick 2- day turn- around on the
Department's bill. The second bill was calendared for a hearing during the first
week that the senate reconvened, much to the amazement of the engineers. Battle
lines were quickly drawn and confusion reigned. The engineers were forced to
testify against the Department's bill even though it would have continued the
regulation of the profession. The Department's bill was finally postponed, without
a vote, once the lobbyists figured out the strategy behind it.
Eventually, the two organizations were able to reach a compromise during this
confrontational initial Sunset review. When the State Board of Registration for
Professional Engineers was reviewed again in 1988, the two organizations worked
in a cooperative and supportive atmosphere. According to Mr. Douglas, the lesson
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learned during the initial review was that "both sides should try to put themselves
in the other's shoes, should learn to live with each other and respect our differences" (Douglas, 1988, p. 10).
Confrontations have not been restricted to the early days of Sunset review.
Two similar confl icts occurred during the 1991 - 1993 Sunset rev iew process in
Texas.
Sunset review in Texas is conducted by a Sunset Advisory Commi ssion
composed of eight legislators and two public members. Between 1991 and 1993,
the Commission was responsible for reviewing 30 agencies, including 20 licensing
boards. During the most recent review, the legislature nearly passed a measure to
wipe out the commission itself because of disagreements over some of the
recommendations. According to an editorial in the Houston Post,
T he major argument legislative leaders have used in advocating the co mmi ssion 's
demi se is that the sunset process has allowed special- interest lobbyists to ga in too
much influence. But that is not the fault of the commiss ion. The blame belongs
to the Legislature, which rejects too many co mmi ssion recommendations and too
o ften does the bidding of lobbyists. (Paxton, April/May 1993, p. 4)

Eventually a compromise was reached with the creation of a panel to study
thoroughly the responsibilities and authority of the commission. A report is to be
presented to the Texas legislature in 1995.
In another instance, conflict among the profess ion, legislature, and the Sunset
Advisory Commission caused the denti sts and dental hygieni sts to lose their
licensing board on August 3 1, 1994 because the legislature adjourned without
reauthorizing the board. The scheduled Sunset (expiration) date for the board was
four months before the legislature would reconvene unless a special session was
held. The governor, upset with the actions of the Dental Association, ensured that
a special session to handle this issue was not held. The Texas Dental Association
had actively lobbied the leg islature to vote against the reauthorization bill because
they did not like some of the recommendations. These included a recommendation
that the governor appoint the chairperson of the dental board ; the Dental Association wanted the chairperson to be appointed by the dental board itself or require the
governor to appoint a denti st rather than a public member.
The other area of conflict evolved around the governor being granted the
authority to appoint three persons of a six- member internal board to oversee dental
hygienists . Under the previous structure, there were eight members on the internal
board and all were appointed by the dental examiners. No action could occur
regarding this recommendation , or the previous one, until the board was reauthorized (Paxton, AprillMay, 1993).
Finally, after a lawsuit was brought against the Dental Board and the State of
Texas, the legislature reauthori zed the Board of Dental Examiners on February 6,
1995, with an effective date of March 1, 1995 . The legislative action occurred just
three days prior to the deadline imposed by the State District Judge. Had the
legislature fai led to reconstitute the Board, the Judge wou ld have ruled the Dental
Practice Act as being unconstituti onal and the licenses of all Texas dentists and
dentla hygientists would have been invalid.
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Ironically, in spite of the various confrontations, including the one between the
commission and legislature, 19 significant across- the- board recommendation s
were approved by the legislature for the 30 agencies reviewed. An additional 10
general recommendations were approved for 20 agencies with licensing functions
and a multitude of specific changes were implemented for each of the individual
licensing boards. Even with the contentiousness surrounding the Sunset review,
1993 was one of the most refo rm- filled years fo r Texas licensure.
When Sunset was first introduced, the concept was heralded as a major step
forward in revising, revamping, and improving the regulatory process. Between the
years of 1976 and 1982, aliSO state legislatures as well as Congress considered the
adoption of Sunset laws. By the end of 198 1, 36 states had adopted Sunset. Since then,
there has been no new Sunset legislation and as of 1993 only 22 states had retained
Sunset legislation. Two states, Florida and Georgia, repealed their legislation in 1993.
(Refer back to Table 1 for a list of states with formal Sunset reviews)
North Carolina was the first state to repeal Sunset (1 981). Since then,
Arkansas, Mi ssissippi , Nebraska, New Hampshire, and Wyoming have also repealed their Sunset laws; Illinoi s, Montana, Nevada, Rhode Island, South Dakota,
and Connecticut have allowed Sunset to become inactive. With the exception of
Illinois, most of the dropout states have "part- time legislatures with low levels of
professionalism, low salaries, low staffin g levels and below average spending on
the legislative institution" (Kearney, 1990, p. 55). A number of states, including
California, Michigan , New Jersey, Ohio, and Wisconsin, have included Sunset
cl auses in selected programs although they have never adopted broad Sunset
legislation .
Why the change from eager acceptance to disenchantment? One of the reasons
is that wide- spread elimination of licensing boards or other agencies did not occur
as anticipated when Sunset was first introduced. Although there have been many
reform s and improvements, as evidenced by Texas ' most recent review, professions
with strong lobbying and fin ancial backing have managed to escape elimination or
major modification that could have res ulted from the reviews. The most frequently
cited probl ems with Sunset are:
(I) failure to reduce the size of government; (2) high temporal and monetary costs
of the process fo r legislators and staff; (3) lack of meaningfu l citizen participating
and the di sproportionate influence of agencies and their lobbyists; and (4) lack of
adequ ate evaluation criteri a to apply to agencies under review. (Kearney, 1990, p.
5 1)

Regardless of the problems associated with Sunset, when implemented properly, significant benefits have been achieved. Sunset has resulted in (a) an
improvement in agency structure, procedures and perform ance (more efficient
methods for investigating and di sc iplining practitioners); (b) enhanced agency
accountability (better management of the agency); (c) a closer alignment between
regulation and public interest (inclusion of public members on boards) and (d)
financial savings to consumers (elimination of restrictions on open competition).
Even in those states that repealed Sunset, the process was relatively effec tive in
terms of its impact on state agencies.
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Montana terminated five agencies ... and implemented over 150 modifications.
Connecticut scored 29 terminations, Arkansas 28, Rhode Island 17 and New
Hampshire 15. Illinois eliminated more than 50 agencies before pulling the shade
on Sunset. (Kearney, 1990, p. 55)

Licensure versus registration and certification
Although this chapter is entitled, "What is Licensure?", It IS important to
mention that two other forms of regulation exist with licensure being the most
restrictive. Unfortunately, many people use the term licensure to reference all
forms of credentialing3 rather than just to mean title and practice protection. The
frequent misuse of the term adds to the confusion already surrounding the actual
definition of licensure.
Licensure, certification and registration can each be conferred upon individuals
and institutions by states. Certification is, however, more traditionally considered
a voluntary mechanism implemented by a nongovernmental entity for the purpose
of recognizing more advanced or specialized skills. Certification is freq uently
granted to individuals who specialize within a profession such as medical doctors
who are certified as Neurologists, Pediatricians, or Obstetricians. Specialists often
indicate that they are "Board Certified", which simply means they have met the
requirements of a state or, more frequently, private agency. Licensure, on the other
hand, is mandatory and must be obtained from state government in order for
individuals to practice specified occupations or professions.
These distinctions, however, are not always accurate and as mentioned previously, certification may be used by states at the entry level. Even the legal use of
these terms can create confusion; "Registered" Nurses are actually licensed as are
"Certified" Public Accountants. In a number of instances, one of the entry
requirements for licensure includes passing an examination offered by a private
certifying agency. Michigan, and a few other states, require dentists who specialize
in only one field of dentistry (Prosthodontics, Oral Surgery, Periodontics, etc.) to
be state certified in their specialty as well as to remain licensed as general dentists.
Registration provides, at most, title, rather than practice, protection. That is,
unregistered individuals can perform the same functions as those who are registered
provided that they do not use a designated title. Registration would be appropriate
when the "threat to life, health, safety, and economic well- being is relatively small
and when other forms of legal redress are available to the public" (Shimberg &
Roederer, 1994, p. 5). In its basic form, registration merely requires individuals
to "register" their names with the appropriate state agency . Minimum entrance
requirements or practice standards are typically not established for the profession.
Certification is also title protection and grants recognition to individuals who
have met predetermined requirements. Noncertified individuals may offer similar
services to the public provided they do not describe themselves as being "certified"
3Credentialing is a generic term that subsumes licensi ng, certification, registration , and institutional licensure by the states, as well as standards of competence where no licensure is required and
certification by private organizations where it is required for practice by reference in state law.
(McCready. 1982, p. 74)
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or hold themselves out as someone who is certified. For instance, dentists may
practice as pediatric dentists in Michigan without being certified provided they do
not call themselves pediatric dentists or indicate that their practice is limited to this
specialty.

A precise distinction among registration, licensure, and certification will
probably never be achieved because of the way in which the meanings of the terms
have been interchanged. Table 2 is provided to assist in understanding the two
factors- mandatory versus voluntary and competency standards versus no competency standards- that are generally employed in the definition of the terms.
Competency standards include specified education, experience, and/or examination
requirements prior to licensure.
Table 2 . Distinction Among Registration, Certification and Licensure

Standards

Critics of licensure are also critical of certification and believe that neither
form of regulation accomplishes the stated goal of public protection. Rather, both
mandatory licensure and voluntary certification are viewed as self- serving to those
who are able to meet the imposed standards. According to Hogan (1979),
"associational policies tend to promote precisely the same harmful effects of
licensure [restricting the supply of practitioners; decreasing mobility; increasing the
cost of services, etc.] although their effects are probably not as pervasive" (p. 336).
Competency Examinations
Whether individuals are licensed by a state or certified by a private association,4 everyone has to demonstrate competency by passing an approved examination prior to being granted a license or certificate. An individual may have been
administered an oral, written, or practical examination or any combination of these
examination formats . Regardless of the adherence to standards and quality
assurance, examinations are often viewed by candidates as unnecessary, tricky, and
inappropriate barriers to practice.
In 1961, John Gardner, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare during the
Johnson administration, made the following statements about tests. Although he
was not specifically referencing credentialing examinations, the sentiments expressed are nevertheless applicable.
The fact that tests may have high statistical reliability and validity does not quiet
the apprehension over their use . ... Apprehension is fostered by the fact that it is
very hard for those without professional training in psychology to understand the
process of mental measurement. No one wishes to be judged by a process he
cannot comprehend .... there is not only fear of the tests but fear of the unknown
bureaucracy that handles the test and acts on the results.
4There are a number of registered professions that do require an examination, although this
situation is not typical.
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No one concerned with the future of testing can afford to ignore these sources of
anxiety. On the other hand, even if these sources of concern were to disappear, the
hostility toward the tests would probably remain. The tests are designed to do an
unpopular job . ... As the tests improve and become less vulnerable to present
criticism, the hostility to them may actually increase. A proverbial phrase
indicating complete rejection is "I wouldn't like it even if it were good." With
tests, the more appropriate phrase might be "I wouldn' t like them especially if they
were good." (Gardner, 1961, pp. 47--48)

During the 30 plus years since Mr. Gardner's comments, tests have definitely
improved and the hostility towards them has definitely not lessened. Tests will not
disappear as they are an essential component of ensuring initial competence.
Enhancements to test development, administration, and scoring have been and will
continue to be made. The remaining chapters in this book detail where we have
been, where we are now, and where we are going with examinations.

Federal Involvement in Licensure
According to the Constitution of the United States, states have the authority for
establishing requirements for and ensuring compliance with occupational and
professional regulation as an exercise of their police power. Prior to the 1970s, with
the exception of the mandate for states to license Nursing Home Administrators, the
federal government viewed state regulation in this area with, at most, a passive
interest. However, in 1971 and again in 1973, the then U. S. Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare (HEW) recommended that states observe a 2-year moratorium on legislation establishing new licensed health care personnel.
Ironically, however, at the same time a moratorium was being urged, the
federal government imposed a requirement that health care reimbursement could
only be paid to providers who were licensed by a state or certified by an approved
national organization. Contradictory messages, such as this, have caused state
legislators and regulators to question whether the federal government accurately
understands the statutory responsibilities of states in terms of deciding who should
be regulated and how it should be accomplished. 5
In 1977, the HEW issued a report entitled "Credentialing Health Manpower"
which urged the adoption of national standards to be developed jointly by states and
professions with limited involvement by the federal government. In fact, the
following position was taken by HEW.
It is important to emphasize that the development and adoption of national
standards should not be confused with federal licensure. Licensure is presently,
and will continue to be, a function of state government. (p. 11)

Various publications by the Office of the Inspector General, Department of
Health and Human Services during the late 1980s continued to emphasize that
licensure is a function of states, yet federal actions seem to convey a different
attitude. It is beginning to appear that the states' traditional responsibility for the
5There are a number of professions regulated at the federal leve l (airl ine pilots or coast guard
masters), but the regulation of these individual s has been retained by various federa l agencies and states
have not been told to assume responsibility for the professions.
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licensure and regu lation of profession s is being slowly eroded by the intrusion of
federal action.
Although it is true that some action taken by the federal government has
improved states ' reg ulatory efforts, thi s has not always been the case. In a number
of instances, regulatory actions taken by the federal government appear to have
been predicated on monetary issues (third party payments; Medicare or Medicaid
funding) rather than on the need for better public protection or improvements in the
quality of service delivered.
Perhaps part of the reason for increased federal involvement is that they
perceive states as not meeting the needs of the public. Often the laws of politics
resemble the laws of physics. If a vacuum exists, something or someone will
intervene to fi ll the void. The federa l government's apparent perception that states
are unable to enact or enforce essential regulatory programs , whether due to
insufficient resources, insufficient collaborative efforts, or a lack of will on the part
of states, has fostered increased federal involvement in regulatory activities (Schmitt,
1989, p.33). The Congress may perceive that they are bei ng responsive to their
constituents by instituting regulatory mandates on states. But is the public
demanding the regulation or are lobbyists for various organ izations starting to apply
pressure on congressmen in the same way they have been applying pressure on state
legislators?
In terms of federal legislation, several major laws have been enacted that have
created a financial and staffi ng burden on states. One of these laws, the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act oj 1987 mandates that states evaluate the competence of
nurse aides employed by nursing homes, establish mandatory training, maintain a
register of those who pass the required examination, establish a mechanism for
handling complaints, and restrict practice if aides are found guilty of abuse, neglect,
or theft.
The actual implementation date of this requirement was pushed back on several
occasions because the federal government failed to recognize fully the impact the law
would have on states. When the legislation was initially enacted, it created a frenzy
of activity and innumerable headaches as states attempted to implement overly vague
or overly specific requirements. The language included in this Act exemplifies the
concept of micro- management. The Act specified the state agency to regulate nurse
aides (at least 11 states fought this requirement and won) and placed a prohibition on
states from collecting any registration fees from nurse aides. Although the legislation
provided no assurance that the quality of care would be raised, it did raise the costs
incurred by nursing homes and subsequently by patients.
It is interesting to note that once an individual' s name is placed on the register,
there is no requirement to remove the nurse aide's name following disciplinary
action. An aide found guilty of abuse, neglect, or theft of a resident's property can,
however, never work in a faci lity receiving Medicare or Medicaid funds. Thus, the
aide remains registered, but cannot work. Another unique aspect of the legislation
is that nurse aides who work in hospitals are not required to be registered. Many
hospitals have, however, establi shed their own requirement that an aide must be
registered before being hired. Nurse aides who work in home health care

22

SCHMITT

organizations are not required by the federal government to be registered , but they
are required to have the same training and pass the same competency evaluation
required of aides who must be registered.
Two companion legislative acts, the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of
1986 and the Medicare and Medicaid Patient and Program Protection Act of1987,
were intended to initiate and then expand upon a National Practitioner Data Bank
(NPDB). The concept behind the creation of a data bank was excellent; the manner
in which the data bank was implemented was less than what many had hoped for.
The first set of proposals to administer the data bank, submitted in 1987, were all
rejected because there was no appropriation of funds for the NPDB. The contract
was bid twice due, in part, to the funding problems. Multiple delays were necessary
before the NPDB was finally implemented on September 1, 1990. Initially, only
medical doctors and dentists were to be included in the bank; then legislation was
created so that most health care providers would be included; then a decision was
made that funding was unavailable for such a massive project. Presently, the data
bank contains information only on medical doctors and dentists.
Since the NPDB was made active in 1990, there have been continual complaints
about the manner in which information is obtained, the cost of retrieving information,
the threat to privacy and due process, as well as the lack of accessibility of information
to the public. It should be noted that the NPDB contains a report on any payment made
in response to a claim by a patient which is causing considerable controversy about
the d~a bank. In fact, during the 1993 meeting of the American Medical Association,
members voted to seek the abolition of the NPDB. As part of his health care reform
initiatives, President Clinton has, however, called for public access to the bank
regarding practitioners with repeated reports.
The 1989 Savings and Loan Bailout Bill included a section mandating that
states license two different classes of real estate appraisers. The argument for
incorporating this requirement was that poorly trained and unqualified appraisers
were partially to blame for the Savings and Loan fiasco . States had to have a
licensure mechanism in place by July 1, 1991 (subsequently delayed for 6 months).
The oversight responsibility for this mandate was given to The Appraisal Foundation, a non- governmental, national appraisal organization. The licensing requirements (education and experience) were dictated to the states and any examination
used not only had to adhere to the required test specifications (not based on
generally accepted testing standards), but also had to be approved by a private
testing organization selected by the Appraisal Foundation. New classifications of
appraisers and expanded requirements for initial and continuing licensure, with
which states will have to comply, are currently being proposed by the Foundation.
According to a September 10, 1993 proposal to revise the appraiser qualifications
criteria, the justification cited for these changes is the need to elevate appraisers and
appraisals to a professional level. The suggested revisions appear to be based on
professional need rather than public need.
The Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990 has also affected the
manner in which state regulatory agencies function. The ADA requires that
facilities used by agencies be able to accommodate the disabled, that all documents
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prepared by agencies include a telecommunication device for the deaf (TDD) phone
number, that policies and procedures relating to accommodations for the disabled
be developed, and that test administration accommodations be made available. In
the latter instance, most states, particularly those with centralized testing divisions,
were providing necessary accommodations prior to the enactment of the ADA.
The requirements of this Act are, in general, reasonable and accommodations
should certain ly be made so that disabled individuals are not discriminated against.
A number of extensive technical manuals have also been prepared to assist states
in their efforts to comply. Nevertheless, there is still considerable confusion as to
what is a "reasonable" accommodation versus too little or too much.
Testing personnel, at the state level and with national testing companies,
concur that many of the questions they have raised will be answered in court rather
than by the Department of Justice. No one at the federal level has been able to
answer questions such as "at what point do reasonable accommodations change the
validity of an exam?" or "how much latitude do testing agencies have in trying to
provide reasonable accommodations for a candidate?" As an example of the lack
of assistance provided, a letter requesting clarification as to whether Michigan
would be required to waive one section of a validated practical examination (as
requested by a candidate) was sent to the Department of Justice in December, 1992.
Several years later, the only response was a letter acknowledging receipt of the
initial inquiry.
In addition to Congress mandating that states regulate certain professions or
report disciplinary action to a central data bank, other federal agencies have become
more actively involved in state regulation. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
has investigated the laws and ru les of a number of professions to determine whether
they promote an anti-competitive environment. Based on the FTC's recommendations, several professions, either at the state level or nationally, have revised their
policies. Although many of the FTC recommendations have been challenged by the
respective professions, the eventual implementation of these recommendations has
been beneficial to the public.
During the latter half of the 1980s, the Office of Inspector General, Department
of Health and Human Services, evaluated the licensure and disciplinary activities
related to five or six health professions. The recommendations offered could have
been more beneficial had there been different, specific recommendations for each
of the profess ions. Instead, the primary recommendations were the same across all
of the reviews .
Future regu latory actions by the federa l government are certain to OCCUI'. For
example, the United States and Canada Free Trade Agreement, as well as the North
American Free Trade Agreement, will undoubtedly have a direct impact on the
operation of regulatory agencies. If enacted, the health care reform measures
proposed by various individuals may also have a sign ificant, yet unknown, impact
on regulation.
It appears clear that the federa l government, either through Congress or federal
agencies, will continue to oversee the operations of states in terms of their
regulatory functions. In some instances, this oversight may prove beneficial; in
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other instances, it may only create additional work for states without producing
demonstrable benefits to citizens.

Future of Licensure
Even though state regulatory efforts may not be optimal and many criticisms
about regulatory inefficiency are justified, major improvements have been made in
the regulatory arena during the last decade. Boards are no longer composed solely
of licensees; legislators are taking a more critical look at the reasons why various
groups want regulation ; barriers to practitioner mobility are being eliminated;
communication among states is being enhanced; unnecessary regulation and requirements are being eliminated; examinations are becoming more valid, reliable,
and relevant to practice; and enforcement efforts are being improved. Even with
all of these enhancements and improvements, additional changes must take place
if licensure and regulation is to better serve and protect the public.
Continuing efforts must be made to clearly and concisely convey to legis lators
the meaning of and purpose for licensure and other forms of regulation, in order for
the haphazard proliferation of occupational and professional regulation to stop.
This does not mean that no new regulation should be enacted or that a total
deregulation of the 1,000 or so professions should occur. Rather, better communication among all interested parties- legislators, regulators, professions, and the
public-should occur so that essenti al regulation is maintained or enacted and
unessential regulation is eliminated or not enacted.
Purpose of licensure. One of the first steps that should be taken is redefining
the purpose for licensure. The current justification of "protection of the health ,
safety and welfare of the public" should be revised so that fewer occupations and
professions can claim that they need licensure to accomplish thi s nebulous goal. A
better goal of licensure might be the "protection of the public from imminent or
significant threat or harm economically, physically or psychologically ." Although
the basic premi se for licensure still ex ists, the intent is more clearly defined.
Legislative evaluations. All state leg islatures, and even Congress, need to
become more active in their scrutiny of professions that wish to achieve li censure
status. Although each and every legislator wants to be viewed favorably by
constituents, lawmakers are going to have to make some difficult decisions that, in
turn, may anger professional organizations.
The concept of Sunrise, either formal or informal, must be expanded to all
states. The prelegislative review procedure must become more critical of the
underlying reasons why occupations and professions desire regulation. The
questions posed earlier in the chapter, as well as the following guidelines, must be
incorporated into the dec ision- making process in order for legislators to make
accurate evaluations of the need for additional regulation.
1. Reg ulation should meet a public need.
2. Government should provide only the minimum level of regulation.
3. If an occupation is to be licensed, its scope of practice should be
coordinated with ex isting statutes to avoid fragmentation and inefficiency in the delivery of services.
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4. Requirements and evaluation procedures for licensure should be clearly
related to safe and effective practice.
5. Every out- of- state licensee or applicant should have fa ir and reasonable access to the credentialing process.
6. Once granted, a credential should remain valid on ly for that period
during which the holder can provide evidence of continued competency.
7. Complaints should be investigated and resolved in a manner that is
satisfactory and credible to the public.
8. The public should be involved in the regu latory process.
9. The regulatory structure should promote accountabi lity and public
confidence. (Shimberg & Roederer, 1994, pp. 3- 19)
Additionally, consideration must be given to the length of time between each
Sunset review. Currently , many reviews are conducted every 5 to 10 years.
Although thi s time frame may be appropriate for some agencies, less standardi zation in the timing of reviews may be necessary. Agencies that are newly created
or that have frequent changes in their laws, rules and practices may need to be
rev iewed more often than every 5 years. On the other hand, old establi shed
smoothly working agencies may need to be reviewed less often than every 10 years.
Restructuring of current laws. Greater attention must also be foc used on those
occupations and profess ions currently licensed. Again, for mal or informal S unset
reviews need to occur on a periodic basis. If the profess ion no longer needs to be
regu lated, deregulation should occur. If changes are needed to the profession's law
and rul es, these changes should be made. If admini strative improvements are
necessary , they should be incorporated.
Situations such as the following should not be allowed to continue. A 1943
Michigan law, as amended, stipulates that horologists (watch makers) must be
reg istered. In the early 1980s, consensus was reached by the profession and the
regul atory agency that thi s law was no longer necessary. During the past 10 years,
no entrance examinations have been given, no licensure applications have been
distributed or filed, no di sciplinary action has been taken, no board meetings have
been held, and no li st of registrants has been maintained. In essence, the regul ation
of horologists in Michigan has ceased except fo r one small probl em- the law still
ex ists. In fac t, amendments were made to it in 1989 as part of a series of
amendments made to other sections of the Occupational Code. Even though there
is total agreement on the deregulation of horologists, legislators have not eliminated
the req uirement from the statutes! Should situations such as th is continue to occur,
the public may begin to view all for ms of regulation as nothing more than a joke.
Entrance requirements. Legislators must also focus on the profession's
entrance req uirements included in new or ex isting regulation . L icensure is intended
to ensure that indi viduals entering a profession possess the minimally acceptable
level of knowledge, skill s, and abiliti es necessary to protect the public. It is not the
purpose of state government to impose stringent requirements so that only the best
can obtain licensure or that only a limited number of individuals can become
licensed.
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Obviously, professions want their members to be viewed as competent and
able to provide quality service, but this does not mean that unrealistic entrance
requirements should be imp lemented. One of the legislators at the 1975 workshops
conducted by Shimberg expressed this problem quite succinctly:
I see this all the time. Every year they [licensing board me mbers] come back to
rai se them [entrance requirements]. I'm not saying the minimum today should be
the minimum 50 years from now, but every year they want something more
stringent. (Shimberg, 1976, p. 38)

Regulatory boards and agencies must assume a greater responsibility for the
development and admini stration of their examinations. Whether examinations are
developed by a board or a central testing agency within state government, or
developed by a private testing company, boards are ultimately responsible for the
validity and reliability of their examinations. Board members must become
knowledgeable about proper testing practices and mu st devote sufficient time to be
certain the examination used to measure competence meets required psychometric
standards. Too often boards transfer their authority to an outside testing organization and therefore "assume" the examinations are appropriate. This attitude must
change if examinations are to truly measure a candidate's competency.
Training. Newly appointed board members, both professional and public,
must receive adequate training so that they know what is expected of them. T hey
need to recognize that their function on a board is to make decisions that will be
of benefit to the public and not just to the profession . This includes an understanding of the level of appropriate entrance requirements as well as appropriate
disciplinary action . Both independent boards and central agencies need to devote
sufficient funds and time to accomplish the necessary training of new members as
well as periodic retraining of current board members.
Continuing competency. In addition to more closely scrutinizing the entrance
requirements, greater concern for continuing competency must occur. Reliance on
continuing education to ensure competency should be replaced with more accurate
periodic assessments of an individual' s competence after initial licensure. Certifying agencies are presently implementing continuing competency requirements for
their members and, therefore, may be doing a better job of ensuring continuing
competency than are the states. Peer reviews, enhanced course evaluations of
knowledge obtained, follow- up evaluations of course participants, practice audits,
and even periodic, comprehensive examinations should be required in order for
practitioners to retain their license or certification.
There is no question that because of the rapidly changing environment,
expansion of new technologies, enhancement of procedures, and the ever-increasing body of knowledge that must be maintained, there is a need for individuals to
continually learn. This is true for both the health and nonhealth professions. It is
also true that technological changes in some professions are more rapid than in
other professions. Accordingly , the format required for continued competency in
some professions may be more stringent or require more frequent assessment than
would be req uired in other professions. Continued competency assessment should
not be mandated just because it sounds like a good thing to do. (Presently,
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continuing education for some occupations has been instituted just because other
occupations have required it and without any other justification.)
Sitting in a classroom for one or more hours does not, however, guarantee
learning; it only guarantees attendance. If specific hours of continuing education
remain a condition for license renewal, the education must become more than just
a classroom experience. Continuing education must evolve into a system that
ensures a person has mastered, over the short and long term, the necessary
knowledge, skills, and abi lities to maintain competence.
Mobility. States must initiate better procedures for ensuring that the incompetent practitioner is unable to cross state lines in an attempt to escape discipline,
while at the same time eliminate the unnecessary barriers that restrict the competent
practitioner from moving from state to state. Greater communication among the
states as well as viable, effective disciplinary data bases are needed. States should
license an individual only after obtaini ng conclusive evidence that no disciplinary
action has been taken or is pending against that individual in other states.
States should review their entrance requirements for individuals who have been
licensed in another state and eliminate arbitrary barriers that are unrelated to
legitimate consumer protection. States need to focus on the competency of the
licensee, not on historical minutia. Is it really necessary for an individual who has
been in practice for 10 years and who has had no disciplinary action taken to be
required to pass an initial licensure examination? Does it really matter if a
competent licensee received only 3 hours credit in a particular subject rather than
4 hours?
At the same time, states should avoid the concept of "I' ll li cense all of your
licensees, if you license all of my licensees." Reciprocity, in the strictest sense,
does not really provide for easy mobility of competent individuals. Endorsement,
on the other hand, permits a state to evaluate whether the initial licensure
requirements in another state were substantially, not exactly, equivalent to its
requirements. To further aid in the mobility of licensees, states should work
together to establish standards (educational, experienti al, examinations and continuing competency) that would be acceptable to ensure competency . Once
standards were obtained, there would be more freedom for licensees to practice in
different states and not be restricted in where they can work.
As a result of an agreement among the European Economic Community,
licensed professionals are now able to practice freely in any of the member
countries. Language competency is not required as a condition for reciprocity. The
member countries have agreed that meeting the requirements for licensure in one
country is sufficient for practice in any of the others. If the various countries in
Europe can reduce the barriers across countries and diverse cultures, shouldn't it be
possible to reduce barriers across states?
The Free- Trade Agreement between Canada and the United States has caused
a number of the national associations of professional boards to re- examine some
of the restrictions placed on licensees who may be interested in practicing in the
other country. Both countries are beginning to assess their individual national
licensure examinations to determine what differences, if any, exist and whether
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such differences are significant. With the enactment of the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), states are required to eliminate questionable restrictions placed on licensees from Canada as well as Mexico who may wish to practice
in the United States and vice versus.
Alternative forms of recognition. One potential change is that government
would no longer regulate individuals per se, but rather would regulate the specific
tasks performed. This concept has already been explored in Ontario, Canada for a
number of the health professions and legislation formalizing this concept was
passed in 1991. The Ontario plan is based on the concept that, among the health
professions, it is the performance of certain acts (i.e., improper manipulation of
joints and muscles) that pose a threat to the public and accordingly it is those acts,
rather than individuals, that shou ld be licensed.
Professions want to be recognized as having achieved certain standards or
qualifications. There may, however, be other methods to obtaining recognition
rather than through licensure.
One idea being considered is the use of Trademarks. Legislation would require
a profession to specify the title, letters, or insignias reserved for persons having the
specified education, examination results, or work experience. Only those persons
meeting the standards would be permitted to use the title, letters, or insignias. The
specific criteria for recognition would be established by a national professional
association, a national certifying agency, a multi certifying agency, or a state
agency. There would be no provision for the evalu ation of an individual's
credentials, but rather, the individuals who held themselves out as a member of the
profession would bear the responsibility for establi shing, if a complaint was
received, that they did indeed meet the criteria. Civil or criminal penalties would
be included in the legislation for anyone who claimed to possess the education,
examination, or experience when they did not.
A simil ar concept was proposed by the California Board of Medical Quality
Assurance (McCready, 1982). Title licensure would permit anyone to perform
health care, but people who wished to use a particular title in their practice would
have to meet certain standards and would have to be licensed. Care providers
would be "required to give prospective patients detailed information about their
training, competencies and proposed treatments and to secure informed consent
prior to treatment" (p. 75). Proponents of this form of recognition believe that it
would introduce greater competition and more freedom of choice into health care.
Critics claim that this would only create greater confusion for the public as they
would be unable to make a "comparative study of health care alternatives" (p. 75).
A third option would be to concentrate more on the licensure of institutions
rather than individuals, particularly in the health care arena. For instance, hospitals,
nursing homes, or other facilities would be responsible for the regulation of
individuals who have privileges in the facility. It would be the responsibility of the
institution to establish standards for being admitted to practice in the institution as
well as to remain with the institution. Objective, pre-established criteria would
have to be applied uniformly if this option were to work. One negative aspect of
institutional licensing is that not all licensees are associated with an institution and
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a separate system would still have to be established for these individuals. Another
potential problem is that there have been antitrust cases against hospitals for
refusing to grant privileges to licensed physicians. Delegating licensing authority
to an institution may not necessarily change the darker side of the licensing culture.
Regulation of a single profession by a single board might need to be changed.
A number of super boards, each of which regulated a number of similar professions, could be created. This might solve some of the problems associated with the
ever increasing number of allied health professions. Rather than a separate board
for each group, which is a significant cost to states, comparable professions would
be licensed under a single law and be regulated by a single board. A concept
initiated in Colorado is the creation of a Mental Health Grievance Board. The four
licensed mental health professions (Psychology, Counselors, Social Workers, and
Marriage and Family Therapi sts) each maintain their individual licensing boards,
but the Grievance Board is responsible for all complaints and disciplinary actions
associated with both licensed and unlicensed psychotherapists. The Grievance
Board is composed of members from each of the licensed professions as well as the
unlicensed psychotherapists.
As a result of the California Board of Medical Quality Assurance's 2-year
study (1 980- 1981), the most extreme proposal for solving the plethora of regulation
was deregulation of all health care practitioners. Proponents for this option state
that the:
existing regul atory system is not effective either at assuring initial or continuing
competence of licensees or at protecting the public from incompetent or unethi cal
practitioners. Furthermore, it is argued that licensure creates a governmentall y
sanctioned monopoly that inevitably increases the cost of health care by limiting
access and freedom of choice. In a free market consumers can choose the kinds
of care they want and the costs they are willing to pay . Mediocre care would be
driven out by competition, and exceptional care would be appropriately rewarded.
(McCready, 1982, p. 76)

Deregulation of many professions is certainly an option that should be
considered and instituted, but whether it would ever be implemented for the entire
health care system is dubious.
Enforcement. Not only must there be revisions to the methods of determining
the need for regulation and ensuring initi al competence, there must also be revisions
to enforcement activities. If government is serious about the licensing of individuals, it must also be serious about its enforcement activities. Additional funding will
have to be allocated by the legislature or fees from licensees will have to be
increased in order to provide greater assurance to the public that regulation is truly
intended for the protection of the public and not the profess ion.
If additional resources are not made available to state regulatory agencies,
complaints by consumers will continue to not be investigated and pursued or will
be investigated in an inefficient manner. Regardless of the state or profession, there
is currently a large number of practitioners who should have been disciplined, but
who continue to practice simpl y because there are too many cases for the agency
to handle efficiently . Decisions have had to be made as to which complaints should
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be investigated immediately and which should be postponed or even ignored. If
states are unable to take the appropriate disciplinary action, other organizations will
have to assume the responsibility.
Institutions themselves will have to do a better job of policing their employees
or practitioners. Insurance companies will need to enhance their role and more
closely review the reasonableness of claims filed, the quality of services provided,
as well as the frequency of complaints against certain individuals. Professional
associations will need to become more aware of the quality of service provided by
their members as well as the behaviors exhibited (i.e., impaired practitioners).
If the enforcement role of nongovernmental entities is expanded, it will
necessitate better communication between the private sector and the regulatory
agency. Currently, someone can be dismissed from a hospital or office for
incompetence and the licensing agency is never informed. The licensee merely
moves to another state, establishes practice, and continues to practice in an
unprofessional or incompetent manner. Unless the regulatory agency is informed
of this situation, nothing can be done to stop the individual. It is critical that
organizations eliminate the notion that they must "keep their dirty linen hidden" if
appropriate enforcement is to occur. Mandatory reporting laws may need to be
enacted to reduce or eliminate protection of colleagues in the professions.
Another group that will need to assist government is the consumer. They need
to become better educated about what they should expect from providers as well as
the appropriate procedures for filing complaints. Consumers need to be less willing
to accept poor quality and more willing to voice their concerns. In order to do this
effectively, they need to receive clear, understandable, yet detailed information
about practitioners' responsibilities and their rights. This information shou ld be
distributed by both the public and private sectors as well as by individual practitioners. States need to develop and institute creative, yet informative, procedures and
methods to help consumers become more aware, informed, and active in the
regulatory process.
Even if discipline is maintained by government, alternatives to formal administrative hearings will need to be instituted. Mediation and informal compliance
conferences will need to become more prevalent. Another optional enforcement
technique might be the issuance of tickets, simi lar to parking tickets. If violations
are observed during an inspection, a ticket is issued and a fine assessed. Rather than
requiring a formal hearing, the practitioner merely pays the fine. If the same or
similar violations are repeated, it might then be necessary for an investigation and
hearing.
By achieving a closer working relationship among regulatory agencies, the
private sector, and consumers, the enforcement process will be enhanced. The
incompetent or unethical practitioner will no longer be able to escape unnoticed.
Conclusion. Reaching consensus on how to best serve the public will be a
major task facing states. The increased interest by the federal government in
occupational and professional regulation will add to the states' financial and
staffing problems. Given the pressures being placed upon states, it appears that
they have two viable options:
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deve lop a closer, more unified working relationship with each other or relinqui sh
regul atory control to the federal government or the professions themselves. While
consumers are requ esting stronger regulatory control, others, including some of the
professions, are suggesting that standards be re laxed or are discussing the concept
of self- regulation. (B rinegar & Schmitt, 1992, p. 57 1)

Should self- regulation be granted, licensure would return to the way it was in
the 17th and 18th centuries.
Whether the changes mentioned will actually occur is difficult to predict. One
thing, however, is certain, and that is that change must and will occur. Legislators,
regulators, members of professional organizations, those who are regulated as well
as those seeking regulation, and consumers need to recognize and accept the
impending change. As we approach the 2 1st century, everyone who has an interest
in regulation must begin to recognize the positions of others. With a change in
attitude, perhaps the various groups will no longer "rail on in utter ignorance of
what each other mean, and prate about an Elephant not one of them has seen."
B.F. Ski nner, a noted psychologist, once said that if people don't change, they
become prisoners of their own experience. Reliance on "we've always done it that
way" will not enable improvements to be made in the future. Regulatory legislation
may have flourished in the 1970s and 1980s, but will the trend continue into the
2 1st century? Will new and improved methods of regulation emerge? Wi II the
critics be heard and changes made? Only time will tell.
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